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Guest Editorial
Better regulation in troubled times
robert baldwin*
Professor of Law, The London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Regulatory climates are of central importance to participants in the health
sector. Regulatory compliance costs are a key concern of all parties – from pro-
viders of front-line services to those developing new pharmaceutical products.
Regulation, moreover, affects a myriad of activities, from the marketing of
drugs to the supply of human organs. It is important, accordingly, to consider
whether governments provide regulatory systems that are user friendly, condu-
cive to certainty, and protective of relevant interests.
Looking at the United Kingdom regulatory environment, it is clear that these
are interesting times. A number of changes are taking place, which may involve
uncertainties for the health sector as much as for others. Most notably, the
period 2005–06 is seeing a fundamental shift of the UK Government’s rhetoric
on regulation. The ‘better regulation’ movement is giving way to the ‘regulatory
reduction’ rallying cry, and, as a result, British regulators now have to deal with
a number of difficult messages from central government. It is worth outlining
how this position has been arrived at and how this places modern regulation
under considerable stress.
The ‘better regulation’ thrust within UK Government can be traced back to
1997. Before that time the prevailing concern was the Thatcherite desire to
deregulate. In 1997, however, the switch from the language of ‘deregulation’
to that of ‘better regulation’ was made. Dr David Clarke, Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster, argued: ‘Deregulation implies regulation is not needed. In
fact good regulation can benefit us all – it is only bad regulation that is a
burden’ (Cabinet Office, 1997).
The better regulation agenda was pressed forward by the Better Regulation
Task Force (which was established in 1997), the Regulatory Impact Unit
was set up at the Cabinet Office, Regulatory Reform Ministers were appointed
in each department of state, and a Ministerial Panel for Regulatory Account-
ability was created in order to improve the regulatory system. The UK’s ‘better
regulation’ rhetoric echoed that encountered in the European Union and the
OECD, and the way to ensure better regulation was seen in terms of the need
to develop and apply a series of regulatory improvement tools and policies.
Central amongst the tools was Regulatory Impact Assessment – a process for
the cost–benefit testing of new regulatory proposals.
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In March 2005, however, two important publications signalled a change
in direction. The Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) released its report,
‘Regulation – Less is More’ (Better Regulation Task Force, 2005a) and the
Hampton Review on ‘Reducing administrative burdens’ (Hampton, 2005) was
published.
The ‘Less is More’ Report (LIM) recommended the adoption of new steps to
reduce administrative burdens on business, and, notably, it urged the introduc-
tion of the following measures:
 The new Dutch approach of introducing a target for reducing administrative
costs to businesses.
 A ‘one in, one out’ rule for regulation, whereby new regulations have to be
matched by deregulatory measures.
The Hampton Review recommended that regulators as a whole should use
comprehensive risk assessments to concentrate resources on the areas that
need them most.
The Hampton recommendations were endorsed by the Government in the
March 2005 budget speech, and, in November 2005, the Chancellor, Gordon
Brown, wooed the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) Conference by
promising to publish new legislation to ensure that there will be ‘no inspection
without justification, no form filling without justification, and no information
requirements without justification’ (HM Treasury, 2005). Across government,
departments have been told to set new targets for reducing (by fixed percen-
tages) the information burdens that they impose on businesses.
The ‘better regulation’, ‘less is more’ and ‘risk-based’ messages involve a
number of tensions, however, and these pose serious challenges for regulators
in coming years. Three difficulties demand particular attention.
Better regulation versus smarter regulation
The thrust of better regulation is to improve regulation by testing it with tools
such as Regulatory Impact Assessment. The lesson of the ‘smart regulation’
philosophy as expounded by Gunningham and Grabosky (1998),1 is that the
best regulatory systems involve optimal mixes of state controls, associational
(or quasi-regulatory) controls and corporate constraints (i.e. controls within
the corporation); and that mixtures of less coercive and more coercive regula-
tory instruments should be employed with an emphasis on less punitive, less
formal controls as first options. Smart regulation thus envisages a movement
away from restrictive, rule-based, ‘command and control’ regimes towards
those that place more emphasis on alternative, less coercive methods as
applied by a variety of institutions – be they regulators, professional bodies,
or companies/service providers themselves.
1 See also Baldwin (2005).
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The tension between better regulation and smart regulation is that better
regulation gives centrality of place to regulatory impact assessment (RIA),
whereas smart regulation advocates complex policy mixes and ‘softer’ styles
of control that are extremely difficult to put through a RIA process. Such mixes
are almost impossible to evaluate numerically in terms of costs and benefits
because of their multi-instrumental and multi-institutional complexity. Any
proponent of a new regulatory system who knows that a RIA process has to
be negotiated will have a huge disincentive to put forward a smart regime and
an almost irresistible imperative to opt for something closer to an old-
fashioned command and control system. On the one hand, the Government
advocates the use of more imaginative, ‘alternative’ and less restrictive
approaches to regulation (Better Regulation Task Force, 2005b), whilst, on
the other hand, it evaluates regulatory proposals with a process that is almost
wholly unsympathetic to such approaches.
Better regulation versus less regulation
The Government is now keener than ever to avoid imposing new burdens
on businesses. It wants to reduce quite significantly the burdens of supplying
information that regulators impose on them. It also wants regulators to
target their enforcement activities more precisely in order to take up less
business time. The problems are, first, that targeting enforcement demands
that inspections and other actions are based on intelligence, and second,
that, if the obligations of businesses or health care bodies to supply information
to regulators are reduced, it is increasingly difficult for regulators to engage
in targeting without generating intelligence independently. Such independent
generation of data may, of course, prove hugely expensive for regulators –
indeed far more expensive for them than for the businesses/health care
bodies that they are controlling (who may have the information quite readily
to hand).
There is, indeed, a further danger in the burden-reducing policy thrust.
This is that the potential savings made are likely to be hugely exaggerated
and that the costs will be underplayed. This is likely to occur in the following
way. If a business or health care body is asked to state what it costs to tell
the regulator how often it changes the filters on a ventilation system, it is liable
to look to the staff time and other resources spent in keeping records. Such costs
are considerably more than those of e-mailing the records to the regulator.
Let us suppose the record keeping costs are £5,000 a year and the e-mailing
costs £20 per year. The burden-cutting saving is liable to be calculated at
£5,020 per year. In fact the real saving is only £20 because the record keeping
needs to be carried out as part of routine management. If, moreover, the
obligation to supply the records is removed (in order to achieve the hoped-
for £5,020 saving), the regulator will have to make investigations to
uncover the relevant data. Those investigations will cost considerably more
than £20.
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Better regulation versus risk regulation
Risk-based regulation involves a targeting of enforcement at those businesses or
service providers who pose greatest risks. As such, risk-based systems offer the
prospect of a more efficient and less intrusive system of control than regimes
that adopt, say, blanket or reactive approaches. Dangers arise, however, when
ministers make statements that lead businesses or health care bodies to believe
that all inspections will be justified according to risk assessments. A central
such danger is that risk-based systems tend to be blind to new risks and risk
creators. They make risk assessments on the basis of a given set of information
on risks and their creators and, as a result, their inspection processes are locked
into a focus on those risks and risk creators. They do not look to new hazards
or new actors because these do not develop risk scores on the extant system (it
was for such reasons that the Hampton Review suggested that risk-based
systems should always be combined with a process of random inspection). It
is random inspection (or another enforcement approach) that will uncover
new issues, not the risk-based system. Regulators and ministers, accordingly,
should be slow to assure businesses, health care bodies or others that all
inspections will be based on prior evidence of risk.
Conclusions: regulation and health care
These are, indeed, extremely interesting times for regulation, and particularly
for regulators. Within government there exist a number of vigorous policy
thrusts, but these are not in complete harmony and many regulators may fear
that they are being asked to straddle a number of horses. An optimistic view
of recent developments is that the Government is shaking up regulation and
that, together with current concerns about burdens, this is likely to produce
more effective, ‘lighter-touch’ controls than were encountered formerly. The
pessimistic analyst may, however, suggest that obsessions with Regulatory
Impact Assessments, burden reductions, and risk-based enforcement systems
are likely to stand in the way of user-friendly regulation, and that these obses-
sions may increase regulatory compliance costs and lower the levels of protec-
tion that are currently found across economic and social activity. In the
health sector, as in other areas, a particular worry may be that tensions within
and between regulatory strategies tend to produce uncertainties unless they are
handled astutely. Such uncertainties affect not only the ability of health service
providers to plan investments – they also impact on compliance costs, the
development of new products or services, and the welfare of patients. The UK
Government may eventually manage to resolve the tensions discussed above,
but many health sector participants will be watching the regulatory climate
with some anxiety over the next few years.
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